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To discover affects within Husserl’s texts
designates a difficult investigation; it points to
a theme of which these texts were forced to
speak, even as they were explicitly speaking of
regional ontologies and the foundations of sci-
ences. For we may at first wonder: where can
affection find a positive role in the rigor of a
pure philosophy that seeks to account for its
phenomena from within the immanence of
consciousness? Does this not mean that the
very passivity and foreignness of affect will be
overlooked; will it not be continually linked to
a Vorstellung that issues as a ray of the pure
ego? That is, will the phenomenological ac-
count of affect be reduced to the cognition of
an object, as Emmanuel Levinas suggests? Yet
there are affects in Husserl’s texts that maintain
their autonomy and resist subsumption to an
objectivating intentionality. We may see this in
the Lectures On the Phenomenology of the
Consciousness of Internal Time: in the longitu-
dinal intentionality of retention, through which
consciousness becomes aware of its elapsed
phases without making them into objects—a
passive synthesis that gives the flow of
time-constituting consciousness the form of a
continually deferred auto-affection.1 We find it
again as early as the fifth Logical Investiga-
tion,2 providing us with the impetus to radical-
ize Husserlian phenomenology.
Logical Investigations introduce us to the
question of the structure of affect: are feelings
to be conceived on the model of intentional
lived experiences, explicitly related to objects,
or are they to be taken as neutral hyletic con-
tents awaiting interpretation? In Husserl’s
careful analyses, affect begins to take on a
meaning of its own, by which it resists falling
into either of these theoretical extremes. While
there are affects in Logical Investigations that
have an intentional structure (feeling-acts),
this intentionality is not itself objectivating
(though it does rely on prior objectivating pre-
sentations).3 Moreover there exist affects that
omit this intentional structure, that no longer
refer to an object, and that inhere simply in the
embodied subject. Yet these feelings do not be-
come meaningless as a result; they have a par-
ticular coloring, a sense that attracts or repels.4
This is the case of feeling-sensations—the
Bodily sensations of pleasure and pain, but
also anxiety, and such drives and desires as
lack determinate objects.5 These examples
bring us into contact with an important and
somewhat ambiguous field of Husserlian phe-
nomenology—that of sensations. Therein we
encounter the above-mentioned sensuous feel-
ings, as well as tactile and visual sensations,
i.e., affections of the Body, and the kinaes-
thetic sensations involved in Bodily move-
ment. The role of these sensations in percep-
tion and the constitution of the lived Body is
specifically addressed in the Second book of
Ideas, to which my essay now turns.6
In what follows we take sensation as our fo-
cus; for it is in this field that an alternative ac-
count of affection can be found, an account of
affect as preintentional and yet essential to the
development of intentionalities. It is here that
Husserl’s concern with faithful description can
yield a theory of affect that his phenomenology
anticipated but did not itself bring about. For
the insight into the ambiguity of feeling found
in Logical Investigations was eventually hid-
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den from view, having been superseded by the
intentional theory of the emotions.7 It will be
our task to steer a difficult path between ver-
sions of sensation that cover over the insight of
Logical Investigations in one way or another.
On the one hand, sensation can be conceived as
representational, as containing a copy or im-
print of the thing to which it refers. At the other
extreme, sensation becomes an amorphous and
undifferentiated content, requiring an addi-
tional interpretative act to reach the object.
Both positions can be drawn from Husserl’s
texts. It is our aim to take the analysis of sensa-
tion in a different direction, opened up by
Husserl but left for the most part unex-
plored—to rethink sensation as a creative, dif-
ferentiating, and dynamic multiplicity, as the
way we feel our contact with the world, with
others, and with our own life.
Empfindnisse in the Second Book
of the Ideas
In Ideas II, Husserl distinguishes several
kinds of sensations that have a role in the work-
ings of the Body, in its perceptions of itself and
of the world; these sensations ultimately con-
stitute the body as lived Body (Leib).8 Among
them are so-called presentational-sensations,
which take part in the constitution of appear-
ances of perceived things.9 Hence there are tac-
tile-sensations in the hand, sensations of tex-
ture that parallel the qualities of roughness in
the touched thing; there are sensations of
warmth in my Body that relate to the warmth of
the fire in front of me. But is this the case for all
presentational-sensations, do they all share in
the qualities of the sensed thing, and re-present
them, as seems to be the case with touch and
heat-sensations? When we speak of visual sen-
sations, of color-sensations in the eyes, does
this mean that actual colors are presented (or
re-presented) in the eyes? The account of sen-
sation becomes difficult at this point. Are we to
claim “images,” the copies of thingly qualities
in us, as intermediaries in our perceptions of
things? If so, perception becomes a mimesis;
moreover, that which is genuinely perceived is
not the red object in front of me, but its imprint,
the sensation of redness contained in my eye.
In such a theory of perception, we are stuck in
immanence; our reality is limited to the surface
of the Body wherein sensations lie, and the
world becomes a construct, a mere projection
from this surface.
Husserl’s account can be pushed to this ex-
treme, but it is clear, at other places, that he
seeks to avoid this. Perception is not a purely
inner construction; it is an intentionality that is
directed outside the subject into the world.
More explicitly, Husserl rejects the assimila-
tion of perceptual consciousness to im-
age-consciousness, or to a symbolic-con-
sciousness that functions by the intermediary
of signs. Hence it is not the image of “redness”
that I see, nor is the sensation a sign that repre-
sents for me the real color; what I perceive di-
rectly before me is the concrete, worldly red
thing.
As a counterpoint to presentational-sensa-
tion, there is another kind of sensation that is
equally necessary to the process of perception.
Thus, “in seeing, the eyes are directed upon the
seen and run over its edges, surfaces, etc.
When it touches objects, the hand slides over
them. Moving myself, I bring my ear closer in
order to hear.”10 These capabilities of the lived
Body are given by systems of kinaesthetic sen-
sations. They are one’s inner sense of the
movements, tensions and possibilities of one’s
own Body. What is significant about kinaes-
thetic sensations is that they are cut off from
the representative function ascribed to presen-
tational-sensations. Kinaestheses play a con-
stitutive role in perception by motivating the
series of tactile and visual sensations, and so
allowing a particular sequence of appearances
of the perceived to unfold; however, there is no
question of mimesis between kinaestheses and
the qualities of the perceived thing.11 It is rather
by moving around things and tracing their con-
tours that kinaestheses make perception, as a
concrete dynamic process, possible.12 In this
sense, the qualitative possibilities and virtual
movements of my Body (as “I can move”) out-
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line the features and possibilities of the world.
Kinaesthetic sensations are hence a function of
my Body’s orientation in the world; they are
my way of feeling the active engagement of my
Body with an outside.
We come to an important juncture; for what
if, instead of treating kinaestheses as excep-
tional, they became our model for rethinking
all sensations? Sensations, then, would not be
representational contents, but Empfindnisse or
sensings as Husserl sometimes calls them.13
This means that color and texture sensations,
etc., are not copies of thingly properties con-
tained in the eye or the hand; we cannot look in
the eye to find the image of redness, or discover
the roughness of the thing in the touching hand.
These so-called presentational-sensations are
rather the way my Body lives in, and experi-
ences, the “redness” of the thing, the roughness
of the surface—as vibrations of its own being.
In other words, they express my feeling of be-
ing-affected by things, my way of resonating
the qualities of the world.14 This would mean
that presentational-sensations do not have a
privileged role in perception; rather, a multi-
plicity of sensations (presentational, affective
and kinaesthetic) blend in every perception,
working as a dynamic whole. And this would
be precisely what Husserl means by sensings
(Empfindnisse).15 Thus the appearance of the
thing in perception is not simply constituted by
its resemblance with Bodily sensations. Per-
ception is rather a function of the bearing of the
lived Body, which at once dynamically pal-
pates the perceived and delimits its outlines. In
this sense, perception depends on the particu-
lar interaction of my Body with the world—its
way of tracing the practical possibilities of this
world and of living in it.16
The reversal we have effected in presenta-
tional-sensations will allow us to rethink the
notion of Empfindnisse in general (be it in ref-
erence to sensuous feelings, kinaestheses, or
presentations). If sensations are not copies
taken from the world, then there is no neces-
sary one-to-one correspondence with the qual-
ities of things. There are hence no isolated
color-sensations, fixed in the eyes, but a whole
array of nuance is taken in every time we see.
Ultimately if our model is the dynamism of
kinaestheses, then we cannot speak of single
sensations (except abstractly). For our inner
movements are not absolutely divisible; they
are experienced as moments of an entire
Bodily attitude, of a total gesture or action. Our
Bodily movements involve a multiplicity of
changing sensations, that overlap and flow into
one another. So all our sensings dynamically
blend in an interpenetrating multiplicity—an
organic whole that is prior to the isolation of
static “sensation-contents” in the work of re-
flection.
Sensuous Multiplicity and
the Constitution of the Lived Body
Sensation is not one; it is doubled, if not
multiplied, within our lived experience. (We
will encounter another sense in which this is
true below. For sensation is not a homogeneous
unity; it always figures internal differentia-
tions.) Sensations form an overlapping and
interpenetrating multiplicity. And it is this in-
terwoven multiplicity that allows the forma-
tion and animation of the Body as Leib, i.e.,
which gives the embodiment of the subject.
In Husserlian terms sensations are held to-
gether by a sensuous, passive synthesis—a
continuous fusion in which each term calls
forth others through their essential intercon-
nectedness.17 It is not the case that external re-
lations are imposed upon preexistent elements;
for the elements are not absolutely distinct, and
their synthesis is at once the condition of their
genesis. Such passive syntheses of sensations
refer us back to ultimate “syntheses which pre-
cede every thesis,”18 including the passive syn-
theses of time-constitution.19
Sensations are thus inseparable “moments”
that form a systemic whole, without extrinsic
parts. There are no single sensations, but sys-
tems and fields of sense. Indeed the concept of
an isolated sensation proves nonsensical, once
we realize that there is no moment at which our
Body ceases to feel. As Husserl points out,
“each new stimulation does not provoke a sen-
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sation as if for the first time, but rather, it pro-
vokes in the sensation-field a corresponding
change in the sensation.”20 It is also for this rea-
son that no two concrete sensations can be
identical. Not only are they differentiated
within the temporal stream, but also qualita-
tively and intensively by their function and lo-
calization on the Body. For what is it that dis-
tinguishes one hand from the other, but the
variously oriented ways in which we feel and
live each one.21
The lived Body is constituted through the
localization of sensations in and on it, for
which touch (bound with kinaestheses) is of
particular importance. My Body, as Husserl
understands it, is not a material substratum. It
is essential to distinguish between a physical,
adamantine body (Körper), a mere object in
the world, and my living, feeling Body or
Leib.22 Their formative difference comes not
from a difference in degrees of complexity, nor
from some distinguishing material mark, but
from the insertion of sensings (Empfindnisse)
into the Body (Leib). As Husserl points out,
“even two lifeless things can touch one an-
other, but the touching of the Body provides
sensations on it or in it.”23 The lived Body
senses, while the mere physical thing remains
indifferent; it lacks that extra dimension of
depth, of inner feeling and possibility, in its
contact with the rest of the world.24
The lived Body is thus distinguished by its
possession of sensations. These sensations are
not free-floating feelings; for it is not some
soul-like entity that feels (such an entity mak-
ing do without space, and ultimately without
the material world). It is precisely the Body,
which is within the horizon of the world, that
senses. Sensations must hence have a localiza-
tion and a spread within the world—a localiza-
tion which is of the world, but which is differ-
ent in kind from the extension of material
things or Körper in the world.25 This spread
which sensations map out, this place in which
they are localized outlines the shape or figure
of a lived Body. Indeed this field of localized
sensations is nothing but that Body.26
But how does such localization take place?
This localization occurs by means of an over-
lap, or more precisely an intercrossing, of
sensings. That is to say, where the Body turns
away from its involvement with things in the
world, and comes to sense itself instead of
things. The Body perceives itself from the out-
side, and that which was only an inner sensa-
tion finds a corresponding site on or within the
form that is now being perceived. This self-re-
flexive capacity is a particular virtue of the
sense of touch, according to Husserl. It is
hence in terms of the exchange of touch be-
tween two parts of the Body, between two
hands for instance, that we can attempt to ex-
plicate the process of localization. Thus, “if
this [touching] happens by means of some
other part of one’s Body, then the [touch]-sen-
sation is doubled in the two parts of the Body,
since each is then precisely for the other an ex-
ternal thing that is touching and acting upon it,
and each is at the same time Body.”27 It is the in-
herent instability of this situation that allows
for the localization of the touch-sensations.
For each sensation can be experienced in a
double way; the sensation within my right
hand can be apprehended as an inner feeling
within that hand (e.g., “smoothness”-sensa-
tion), or as an outer perception of the left hand
(e.g., as smooth surface). This doubling which
can be found in all sensations is complicated in
the case of one hand touching the other.28 For
my left hand is also a field of sensations. As the
right hand is touching it, the left hand can feel
its being-touched, can sense this from within;
or reversing the apprehension: the left hand can
perceive the touching action of the right hand
from without, as that hand pays attention to its
own “touch”-sensations within.29 To make the
description more concrete: the right hand is
touching, is pressing and caressing, the surface
of the left hand. While the right hand has the
outer perception of the smooth relief of the left
hand, the left hand has an inner feeling of pres-
sure along its surface where the right hand is
touching it. The reverse can also occur: the left
hand can turn its attention to the properties of
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the right hand, to the rough tip of the index that
is pressing against it, while the right hand pays
attention to the way it moves over the surface
of the left hand, and to the sensation of
“smoothness” that it now has as a result of this
touching. It is this reciprocity that allows for an
internally felt sensation to be localized within
the externally perceived Body.
The surface of the Body is made up of such
intersections and exchanges of sensations, of
Empfindnisse: between the sensations of touch
that give the Body as a tactile surface; between
these touch-sensations and other sensings
(sensations of warmth and pain, kinaesthetic
sensations, as well as the visual and the acous-
tic, etc.). By means of the reflexivity of touch,
and the partial reflexivity of other senses such
as sight, these sensations are localized in the
Body to different degrees—constituting it as a
feeling, seeing, hearing and moving unity.30
But the sensations that make up the lived Body,
also prevent this constitution from ever being
fully accomplished, so that the Body is “a re-
markably imperfectly constituted thing,” for
Husserl.31 The reflexivity of the senses is per-
formed across a gap. For the very doubling of
sensation means that, while sensations may
overlap (e.g., “smoothness”-sensation and
pressure-sensation), they are never identical or
fused into one.32 The Body is thus a provisional
unity, and the synthesis of the senses is an
open-ended communication.
The Ambiguous Structure of Sensation
Thus each sensation is given as a multiplic-
ity; for it has a twofold structure, a doubling by
which it can be apprehended as inner or as
outer (according to a reversible direction of at-
tention). The illusion of “representa-
tional”-sensations stems from a misunder-
standing of this double structure. One side of
the structure eclipses the other. The outer is im-
posed upon the inner, so that sensation is no
longer the way we feel our contact with things,
but a facsimile of the appearances of things as
they are presented in external perception. In
this sense, the concept of “representa-
tional”-sensation gives a partial truth. For sen-
sations are given in such a way as to contain an
internal reference or directedness to the world.
Their structure is that of “transcendence in im-
manence.” Sensations are affective, for they are
the way in which the world impresses itself
upon my Body; but they are also indicational or
constitutive of that world and the things out-
side my Body.33 Indeed one side of this revers-
ible structure conditions the other; for the way
in which I feel the world presents the world to
me in a particular coloration, just as the relative
orientation of things gives them to me in a par-
ticular order and perspective. It is important for
us to note that both the so-called presenta-
tional-sensations (sensations of touch and vi-
sion, etc.) and the kinaesthetic sensations share
in this double structure. For, as we have seen,
kinaestheses play a necessary constitutive and
motivating role in our perceptions of the
world.34
Our reconceptualization of sensation not
only deepens the Husserlian account of em-
bodied subjectivity, but enables other and more
radical stories of embodiment, breaking
through the usual norms of what it means to be
a Body. For its inherent differentiation presents
sensation as an ambiguous or mixed nature.
Sensation appears as an original junction of
subject and object, or more precisely, subject
and other. It is for this reason that sensation
holds an ambiguous status within Husserlian
phenomenology; for it permits, on the one
hand, the formation of one’s own Body (as
lived, subject Body), and on the other hand, the
constitution of things and the perception of a
world. Sensation is at the boundary of the sub-
jective and the alien. What is mine and what is
alien may later be divided along strict lines, in
light of the norm of a full-fledged Ego of
intentionalities; but in the preintentional mo-
ment of sensation they remain intertwined.
Thus Husserl refers to sensation as impress-
ional, as an original foreignness that affects the
Ego;35 but these same sensations are also my
most subjective possessions.36 And it is
through their localization in the body that this
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body becomes my own, animated with my own
life.37
The genesis of subjectivity finds its locus
here. In this context, subjectivity appears as a
hollowing out or an interruption within the
world—there where sensation is introduced.
What sensation insinuates within the plane of
the world is a dimension of difference, of depth
and interiority of feeling. That part of the world
which is the “bearer of sensations” is trans-
formed, constituting the lived Body and giving
the beginnings of subjectivity. The subject then
keeps a trace, within its constitution, of the for-
eign out of which it was made.
Paths of Affection and the Temporality
of Sensation
Though our theory of sensation may seem
to have taken a somewhat static view of the
Body, and of the workings of sensation within
it, the temporality of sensations was implicit
within our account. Within kinaestheses, as
well as within the passive syntheses which
hold together the multiplicity of Bodily sensa-
tions, the temporal structure of sensation can
be seen. With the explicit consideration of
time, our picture of interwoven sensations be-
comes dynamic. We come to realize that sensa-
tions are not purely instantaneous; each con-
crete sensation involves a certain temporal
condensation, a trail of retentions by which it
intermeshes with other sensations, and of
protentions by which it anticipates its own
reenactment (which will not be a self-identity).
Thus, as Husserl notes, sensations linger on in
the Body, after the objects to which they refer
have disappeared.38 Sensations have a dyna-
mism of their own, an evolution and flow by
which they motivate one another, and install
themselves as tendencies within the lived
Body. Thus the extra dimension that sensation
insinuates into the body is not simply a differ-
ent spatiality—that is, a dynamic envelopment
and intertwining, rather than a static juxtaposi-
tion of parts. But that which distinguishes the
Body of sensations from the merely material
body is a particular temporality—to which
lived, Bodily space owes its dynamism and its
envelopment.
This temporalization of sensation allows us
to ask how sensations come to constitute, to
evolve into, one’s particular affective attitude
toward the world, one’s habits and disposi-
tions. When sensations are inserted within the
history and genesis of the embodied subject,
motivations and associative tendencies appear
within the nexus of sensations; motivations,
which for Husserl, need not always be rational.
Recurring sensations and patterns of move-
ment form a kind of Bodily memory, and
protend their continuation, inclining toward
particular Bodily attitudes and comportments
in the future. In this way “paths of affections”
are opened up in the embodied subject, which
define one’s particular Body and the way in
which one experiences and moves in the
world.39 Thus my lived Body receives its char-
acteristic coloring as my own, as bearing
within it the sedimentation of my life;
correlatively, the world that solicits and con-
fronts this Body receives its own coloration,
mirroring my dispositions and habits. But none
of this is to say that the sedimented sensa-
tion-fields and patterns necessitate our behav-
ior; for these sedimentations incline and moti-
vate as a concrete style of life, without the
dynamic evolution of our Body and our
sensings ever coming to an end.
Conclusion: Sensations and the
Phenomenological Account
of Embodiment
Our purpose has been to present a theory of
sensation that enables a more productive
phenomenological account of embodiment.
Sensation allows us to see beyond the material-
ity of the body (Körper) to a dynamic and
evolving embodiment (Leib). This embodi-
ment does not require a foundation in material-
ity (despite what Husserl sometimes says), but
rather finds its unity in the intertwining of sen-
sations.40 At the same time, if the Body is not
given as a self-identical piece of matter, it is be-
cause sensation constitutes the Body as an
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original intercorporeity—open not only to its
own touch, but to contact with the world, and to
the touch and vision of others. Through sensa-
tion, it becomes possible to question the
self-contained and clearly delimited image of
the Body—the Body as seat of an Ego’s will
and control. Our aim, which goes beyond the
scope of this essay, is to make a space for other
understandings of embodiment that are shaped
as much by the outside (including culture, lan-
guage, history, etc.) and by others, as by the ef-
forts of a conscious Ego. The formation of the
lived Body is not a determination that would be
in line with the Ego’s constitution of material
things. The Body is neither mere material
Body, nor pure Ego. It is a hybrid—or, more
precisely, a more original unity—whose prop-
erties fall outside either category, and whose
nature is revealed in the study of sensations.41
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and spreading into are precisely something that dif-
fers essentially from extension in the sense of all the
determinations that characterize the res extensa”
(ibid., p. 149).
26. “The touch-sensing is not a state of the material thing,
hand, but is precisely the hand itself, which for us is
more than a material thing, and the way in which it is
more entails that I, the ‘subject of the Body,’ can say
that what belongs to the material thing is its not mine”
(ibid., p. 150).
27. Ibid., p. 145.
28. “And in the case in which a part of the Body becomes
equally an external Object of another part, we have
the double sensation (each part has its own sensa-
tions) and the double apprehension as feature of the
one and of the other Bodily part as a physical object”
(ibid., p. 147).
29. The touch-sensations in the two hands need not be the
same type of sensation. While my right hand is sens-
ing the smoothness of the left (i.e. my right hand is
having “smoothness”-sensations), the left hand could
be feeling itself tickled or pinched by the right hand.
The same play can still take place (with Husserl’s ex-
ample becoming somewhat more complex). What is
important is for there to be tactile-sensations in both
hands that can alternate between outer perception and
inner sensing.
30. “. . . it becomes a Body only by incorporating tactile
sensations, pain sensations, etc. – in short, by the lo-
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calization of the sensations as sensations” (Ideas II, p.
151).
31. Ibid., p. 159.
32. The gap, we should note, is both temporal and spatial.
Either the doubled sensations constitute different
hands (e.g. the “smoothness”-sensation in the right
hand, and the pressure-sensation in the left), or they
constitute the same hand, but at successive moments
in time (e.g. the “smoothness”-sensations and the
kinaestheses of the right hand, which are attentively
given at different times).
33. “. . . precisely the same sensations which function as
indicational or presentational with respect to the
thing, paperweight, function as touch-effects of the
paperweight on the hand and as sensings produced in
it” ( Ideas II, p. 146).
34. “My hand is lying on the table. I experience the table
as something solid, cold and smooth. Moving my
hand over the table, I get an experience of it and its
thingly determinations. At the same time, I can at any
moment pay attention to my hand and find on it
touch-sensations, sensations of smoothness and cold-
ness, etc.. In the interior of the hand, running parallel
to the experienced movement, I find motion-sensa-
tions, etc.. Lifting a thing, I experience its weight, but
at the same time I have weight-sensations localized in
my Body” (ibid., p. 146).
35. “The word ‘impression’ is appropriate only to origi-
nal sensations; the word expresses well what is ‘there’
of itself, and indeed, originally: namely what is
pregiven to the Ego, presenting itself to the Ego in the
manner of something affecting it as foreign” (ibid., p.
336).
36. Basically sensations are my most subjective posses-
sions, according to Husserl, because they are also my
first possessions, the ultimate “pregivennesses for all
the Ego’s operations” (ibid., p. 214). The distinction
which Husserl makes here (and which allows him to
navigate the ambiguities associated with sensation) is
that between a subjective having, a possession of the
subject, and a subjective doing, acts or states of the
subject (ibid., p. 317). (But if sensations are also
sensings, then should not the rigidity of this distinc-
tion be questioned?)
37. “On this surface of the hand I sense the sensations of
touch, etc.. And it is precisely thereby that this surface
manifests itself immediately as my Body” (ibid., p.
150).
38. “But if I attend to the hand and the finger, then they
have touch sensations which still linger when the
hand is withdrawn” (ibid., p. 146).
39. Ibid., p. 337.
41. In this sense the self-affection, and self-constitution,
of the lived Body can be compared to that of the flow
of time-constituting consciousness. The peculiarity
of this consciousness is that, while responsible for the
constitution of immanent time, it is not itself in time,
nor does it require some other consciousness behind
the flow that would hold it together (cf. On the Phe-
nomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time,
pp. 381–82).
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